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Methodology: Measuring Hierarchical 
Capture
Why examine the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)?
• Has been utilized extensively in previous research, has public 
and easily-accessible data of their regulatory activity, and is a 
high-profile agency that regulates a heavily polarized issue.
Dependent Variable: The quantity of EPA-led and initiated 
enforcement activities per day under each administrator.
Primary Independent Variable: Appointee’s Work Experience:
1) Public Experience: government agencies, political appointments, 
military service, academia, non-profits.
2) Private Experience: private corporations, consulting, and self-
employment.
3) Political Experience: running/holding elected office, campaign 
work, and political support staff including congressional aides and 
liaisons.
Secondary Independent Variables: Average workforce size and 
average EPA budget (converted to 2017 USD) under each 
administrator.
Controls: Appointing president’s party and Unified/Divided 
government.
Though there have only been 14 Senate-confirmed EPA 
administrators, regression analysis, cross-tables, and various plots 
can still help us understand trends that could increase likelihood 
of capture.
Introduction
Economist and Nobel laureate George Stigler coined the term Regulatory 
Capture
• Occurs when regulators craft more lenient regulation to benefit a 
particular industry in exchange for some kind of benefit from said 
industry (Stigler, 1971).
Since the early 1970’s, the American public has increasingly felt 
disenfranchised from the government agencies that are tasked with 
regulating in their interest. The fields of Economics and Political Science 
have developed several theories to help explain these phenomena:
• Capture – Has evolved since it’s inception to include the “identification 
with the industry, sympathy with the particular problems that regulated 
firms confront in meeting standards, and [the] absence of toughness” by 
a government agency (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 61). 
• Iron Triangle – Policy issue networks between Congress, the bureaucracy, 
and interest groups wherein “members are motivated by passion and 
ideals as much as by the chance of economic gain” (Overman & 
Simanton, 1986, p. 584).
• Revolving Door – Relationship between public and private sector where 
policy makers with backgrounds in regulated industries hold significantly 
laxer regulatory attitudes towards the industries they were previously 
employed by as a result (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992).
So which one is right? In my research, I argue that they all are in a 
new theory that I refer to as Hierarchical Capture.
Theory
Hierarchical Capture – Rather than capture happening 
passively through relationships between industries and 
regulatory agencies, it can also be initiated from the top 
and within said agencies through the political 
appointment process.
• The work experience of political appointees can explain their attitudes 
towards their agencies, and in turn, explain the enforcement activities of 
the agency they head.
• However, there are exogeneous factors that also affect the 
volume of enforcement activities, including the political 
party of the President, whether the government is unified or 
divided, and the agencies appropriated budget and 
workforce size.
Hypothesis #1: An appointee with more private sector experience will run 
an agency that initiates less enforcement activities.
Hypothesis #2: Appointees who came from the industry they regulate will 
oversee less enforcement activities.
Hypothesis #3: Republican presidents will appoint individuals who will 
oversee a lower volume of inspections relative to a Democratic appointee.
Hypothesis #4: Agencies that are appropriated smaller budgets and 
workforces will initiate less enforcement actions
Data
• Enforcement activities were downloaded from the EPA’s 
Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) website:
• The Integrated Compliance Information System for 
federal civil enforcement case data (ICIS FE&C 
Data Set) contains enforcement activities 
throughout the entire life of the EPA.
• EPA’s budget and workforce size was gathered directly from 
their website (https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget) 
• Work experience of each administrator was hand coded based 
on EPA biographies and other government websites. Experience
years were rounded to the nearest whole-number.
Discussion
• Given the small sample size, the hypotheses cannot be wholeheartedly confirmed.
• Only variable with statistical significance was workforce size; the next most 
significant variable was experience in the environmental industry.
• However, the trends illustrated do provide preliminary support for Hierarchical Capture.
• Higher proportions of experience in the private sector led to lower enforcement 
actions initiated per day amongst EPA Administrators (vice versa for higher 
proportions of political experience).
• Judicial actions continue to decrease, both proportionally and as whole, which 
could be viewed as a change in intensity of enforcement actions
• In sum, my aim with this research is to lay the foundation for a more holistic understanding 
of bureaucratic behavior – further research ought to encompass a large, cross-sectional 
analysis of various agencies, including additional variables.
Findings
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